Japan Data Breaches, Oct–Nov 2026: What Companies Should Check
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From October into November 2026, a series of major cyber incidents has been disclosed in Japan. Where the damage occurred varies: e-commerce member data, an email delivery service, a cloud platform and a university's systems.
This article sets out the facts based on each organisation's official announcements and summarises what you should check at your own company. It is not meant to criticise any particular company. Many of the figures and causes are still under investigation. The content is as of 4 November 2026 and may change.
Key takeaways
- Three of the four cases involve outside services or contractors. Damage can reach you even if your company did nothing wrong.
- On 8 October, JPCERT/CC issued an alert about the string of unauthorised access incidents in Japan, urging organisations to inspect internal systems and APIs too.
- First, make a list of which outside services hold what personal information.
- Entrusting less information and keeping your own backups both reduce the damage.
~7 million
Nojima Online member records
~77 million
Arara: email addresses, including those possibly taken (under review)
495
Companies and local governments affected by the IDCF Cloud outage
Terms used here
Unauthorised access = getting into a system without permission.
Ransomware = an attack that encrypts data so it cannot be used, and demands a ransom to restore it.
Subcontracting = when a company that has taken on work hands part of it to yet another company.
API = a point of contact through which programs exchange data.
Main incidents disclosed
| Organisation | Disclosed | What happened | Scale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nojima | 2 November | Unauthorised access to the e-commerce site's member management system | About 7 million records |
| Arara | 29 October, 2 November | Unauthorised access to an email delivery service | About 77 million (including those possibly taken, under review) |
| IDC Frontier | 7–27 October | Ransomware attack on a cloud platform | 495 companies and local governments affected |
| Osaka Metropolitan University | 2–21 October | Failure of its information infrastructure system. An account of NEC's subcontractor was misused | Under investigation |
Nojima: about 7 million e-commerce member records
Nojima announced on 2 November that it had detected unauthorised access to the member management system of "Nojima Online" on 1 November, and had confirmed a leak of personal information the same day. The sites concerned are "Nojima Online" and its "used smartphone buyback site", with about 7 million records (excluding former members).
The information concerned is name, date of birth, gender, address, phone number, email address, login ID and encrypted password. Nojima says that it does not hold credit card information on these two sites. The cause and any secondary damage are under investigation, and the sites concerned are suspended.
Arara: from an email delivery service out to its client companies
Arara disclosed unauthorised access to its email delivery service "Arara Message" on 29 October. In a second report on 2 November, it revealed that the scope of the damage had grown.
- Client company environments: 97 servers, up to about 380 companies (estimated). About 77 million email addresses. This figure includes those possibly taken and is under review, and it does not indicate the number of users.
- Shared environment: 61 client companies. 3,386,187 email addresses, and up to 411,827 customer data records from 5 companies.
- The service was abused to send up to about 7.13 million suspicious emails posing as credit card companies.
- All services were stopped on 31 October, and no date has been set for restarting them. Arara says it does not hold credit card numbers.
On the cause, Arara cites "a web server vulnerability and problems in the system environment". The route of the intrusion and when it began are under investigation.
IDC Frontier: ransomware damage to a cloud platform
IDC Frontier disclosed that part of East Japan Region 1 of "IDCF Cloud" was hit by a ransomware attack in the early hours of 7 October. The attack has affected 495 companies and local governments.
According to its seventh report on 27 October, the cause was a vulnerability in open source software used in the management portal's authentication system. The attacker illicitly obtained administrator privileges on the virtualisation platform and encrypted virtual servers. No trace has been found of data inside the virtual servers leaking outside. On the other hand, the registration information of up to 71 companies was illicitly viewed on the management portal. 206 customer companies were able to retrieve data from backups, and the company says it has neither paid a ransom nor negotiated.
Osaka Metropolitan University: a subcontractor's account misused
At Osaka Metropolitan University, a large-scale failure of the information infrastructure system occurred on 2 October, which also affected classes. On 21 October the university published what NEC had reported to it. A business to which NEC subcontracts system development and maintenance suffered a cyberattack in late September, and that business's legitimate account was used to gain unauthorised access to the university's systems.
A leak of personal information and other data relating to the university, held in cloud storage that NEC was using, has also been reported. The content and number of items are still being confirmed, and the investigation continues into whether anything leaked from the university's virtualisation platform.
JPCERT/CC's alert
On 8 October (updated on the 23rd), JPCERT/CC published an "Alert on the recent string of unauthorised access at organisations in Japan". It does not explain the four cases above. It summarises the methods confirmed in the information leaks that have continued in Japan since around September 2026.
| Method | What it involves |
|---|---|
| Searching for known weak spots | Looks for known vulnerabilities, and also targets management lapses involving items such as configuration files and backup files |
| Abuse of APIs | Analyses public apps to identify the entry points and keys, then carries out operations that are not possible from the screen |
| Metabase vulnerability | Exploits CVE-2026-72898, a vulnerability in a data analysis tool |
| Planting web shells | Places a file on an application server that runs commands remotely |
| Abuse of AI tools | Uses AI tools that are meant for security testing to look for weak spots in public sites |
What stands out is that the damage reaches beyond services for general customers to systems that only people inside the company should be using, such as analysis tools and management systems for staff.
What the four cases have in common
Damage outside reaches your company
An email delivery service, a cloud, a maintenance subcontractor. Attacks that happened outside the company reached its information and operations.
Management entry points are targeted
Entry points with strong privileges were used, such as admin screens, management portals and maintenance accounts.
Being able to restore makes the difference
At IDCF Cloud, it was expected for a time that retrieving data would be difficult. Backups in a separate location are what you can rely on.
Eight things to check at your company
- Make a list of outside services
Write down the services that hold your customer information: email delivery, e-commerce, booking, cloud, accounting and so on.
- Review the information you entrust to them
Does email delivery really need postal addresses and dates of birth? The best protection is not to register fields you don't use.
- Delete old data
JPCERT/CC also recommends deleting data past its retention period and data whose purpose has ended.
- Check your contractors and subcontractors
Ask who holds maintenance accounts, whether any work is subcontracted, and whether accounts of people who have left are still active.
- Protect admin screens
Turn on multi-factor authentication and restrict where connections can come from. Stop exposing admin functions you don't use.
- Inspect internal systems and APIs too
Check whether analysis tools and internal systems can be opened from the internet, and whether APIs have permission checks and rate limits.
- Keep backups in a separate location
Store them not only in the same cloud but in a different environment as well, and test that you can actually restore them.
- Decide your contact procedure in advance
Decide who makes the call and how you will contact customers and the relevant bodies. A leak of personal data may require a report to the Personal Information Protection Commission and notification of the individuals concerned.
If your company uses Arara Message
Arara says it will contact every client company individually. Check what it tells you, and if your company's information is involved, consider informing your customers. When the service restarts, a reset of admin screen passwords and API keys is planned. If you use the same password on other services, change it there first.
If you personally received a suspicious email
Arara is urging people not to open the URLs in emails received from news@arara.com on 28–30 October with subjects such as 「利用内容確認のご依頼」 (request to confirm usage) and 「ご利用明細確認のご依頼」 (request to confirm your statement), and to delete them. If you entered your card details, contact your card company immediately. If you are a Nojima Online member and use the same password on other sites, it is safest to change it on those sites too.
Questions for your contractors
- Which servers or clouds is our information stored on?
- Do you have subcontractors? Can they also get into our systems?
- Do you use multi-factor authentication on maintenance accounts?
- How do you check for vulnerabilities in the software you use?
- If an incident happens, within how many hours will you contact us?
For what to do about specific software, see "What to Do About the WordPress Vulnerability", "What to Do About the Ivanti Vulnerabilities", "What to Do About the PHP Vulnerability" and "What to Do About the GitLab Vulnerability". If you can't reach your contractor, see "Taking Over a Legacy System With No Documentation".
How Digi Dinos can help
Digi Dinos is a software company with offices in Vietnam and Japan. Over 8 years we have delivered more than 150 projects. We are ISO 27001 certified, and our team works in Japanese.
- Review of your internal systems: we sort out which systems hold what information and who maintains them.
- Taking over maintenance of existing systems: PHP, Java, Node.js, Python, .NET and more.
- Responding to new vulnerabilities: when a fix comes out, we assess the impact and apply it.
- No documentation? No problem: even when the original vendor is gone and nobody understands the system, we read the code, rebuild the documentation and propose a complete plan.
- Lifetime warranty: if a defect turns up in work we did, we fix it, with no time limit for as long as the maintenance contract continues.
Not sure where to start checking? Free consultation.
We guide you in Japanese, starting from sorting out your current systems, even if you can no longer reach your contractor.
Frequently asked questions
Is a leak at a contractor also our company's responsibility?
A company that entrusts the handling of personal data to a contractor has a responsibility to supervise that contractor properly. The specific judgement differs from case to case, so check with a lawyer or the guidance from the Personal Information Protection Commission.
If passwords are encrypted, are they safe?
They are harder to read straight away, but they cannot be called absolutely safe. If you use the same password on other sites, it is safest to change it.
If we use the cloud, can we do without backups?
No. Cloud providers can be attacked too. Store important data in a separate environment as well, and regularly test whether you can restore it.
How far should a small company go?
You don't need to do everything at once. Just making a list of outside services and turning on multi-factor authentication for admin screens is a big step.
Sources
- Nojima, apology and notice on the personal information leak caused by unauthorised access to Nojima Online (2 November 2026)
- Arara, notice on the information leak and service suspension caused by unauthorised access to "Arara Message" (29 October 2026)
- Arara, second report on the same incident (2 November 2026)
- IDC Frontier, seventh report: investigation results on the unauthorised access and next steps (27 October 2026)
- Osaka Metropolitan University, temporary notice site (21 October 2026)
- NEC, notice (20 October 2026)
- JPCERT/CC, alert on the recent string of unauthorised access at organisations in Japan (8 October 2026, updated 23 October)